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Power Competition in The Arctic Region: A Comparative Analysis

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Abstract

As a result of climate change, the polar ice at the North Pole is rapidly vanishing, which has far-reaching consequences for the strategic terrain of the region. Russia, China, and the United States (US) have elevated their efforts in response to the prospects of economic expansion and escalating security rivalries. Exploring the strategic interests and opportunities of these three Arctic nations, this research paper employs a qualitative methodology to investigate the shifting geopolitics of the region using a structural realist framework. The research illuminates the geo-political and strategic ramifications of geo-economics in the region, as well as the inter-state rivalries among these nations that have precipitated increasing apprehensions and policy changes. The paper illustrates how Russia adopts a realist stance, China adopts a developmental stance to expand its influence, and the US strives to increase its power in the region to counterbalance the influence of China and Russia. Furthermore, the paper elucidates the correlation between the offensive-defensive balance and security dilemma stemming from the neo-realistic conduct of these states and the interplay of regional interests.

Key Words: *Arctic Geography, Strategic Interests, Security Dilemma, Strategic Convergence, New Shipping Routes, Potential War Zone.*

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Introduction

The Arctic region is a polar region expanding over eight states and three continents: US, Canada, Russia, Sweden, Greenland, Norway, Iceland and Finland. This region, once an isolated and ice-covered area, has now emerged as an arena of major power competition. The ice in the Arctic region is melting which results in exploration of extractive activities, new shipping routes and faster global trade. Three Key major players Russia, China and the US have stakes in this arctic region because of opening of new ventures in domains of fishing, oil, gas, hydrocarbons and rare earth elements. Russia has stakes in this region because of deployment of its nuclear forces and significant Navy fleet.

Russia claims major areas of Arctic Ocean shorelines. After the cold war, US interests in this region were less. However, priorities have tilted towards this region after 2009 and focus shifted towards protection of environment and commercial activities. China declared herself as a "Near Arctic Region" state and elucidated her regional standing (CRS, 2024). The project of Polar Silk Road shows China's efforts in becoming a major stakeholder in Arctic region. The convergence of China and Russia are posing a potent threat to US and its Allies. In response, the US is endeavouring to increase its power. The neo-realist behaviour of these states is shaping this region as a hub of geopolitical hotspot. The Arctic region comprises security, military, political and economic interests of states.

In recent years, the Arctic region has observed growing geo-political, geo-economic and geo-strategic competition among major powers including US, Russia, China and other Arctic states. These competitions have raised concerns about the potential of conflicts. Three major players: Russia, China and the US have stakes in this region, which has led to strategic convergence and divergence. The convergence and divergence have transformed this region as a hub of geo-political contestation. The rapid environmental changes or geo-political shifts are influencing China, Russia and the US behaviour in terms of security preparedness, territorial claims and new maritime strategies. The state behaviour of three major key players: China, Russia and the US

examined through the lens of neo-realism theory. This relationship enables to understand the challenges and opportunities presented by the changing Arctic landscape. The research also ripostes various inquiries as to how the exploration of natural resources, territorial claims and strategic military interests of Russia, China and the US give rise to major power conflicts in Arctic Region. Furthermore, the research focused on geo-political, geo-economic and geo-strategic significance of Arctic Region.

The study discussed the neo-realist behaviour of major arctic states like the US, China and Russia and pursued how they influenced each other for power and enhancing their capabilities in the Arctic region. And last section, discussed the China-Russia convergence that posing a threat of military confrontation with the US and her Allies. Neo-realism is a theory that emphasises states' power that has been derived from structure of International Order (Karpowicz & Julian, 2023). Each state desires power maximisation because of absence of international authority and in response of threat posed by other states.

Neo-realism has some major concepts and assumptions. The prime assumption is that global political order is anarchic and players in international political system are states. Secondly, the assessment of offensive military capabilities by states is another assumption of the theory. Third assumption is the prevalence of uncertainty in the intentions of states. Fourth, the realist considered the primary goal of states is survival and the fifth one is rationality associated with states. Neo-realism proposes that every power imbalance leads to conflicts in the region. By utilising the lens of neo-realism, the research demonstrated the interests and undertakings of great powers i.e., Russia, China and the US and their assumptions of power maximisation.

Geo-Political Significance of the Arctic Region

The physical milieu exerts a profound influence on the economic and social environments, which in turn defines the political landscape of the Arctic region. A multitude of international jurisdictions, Exclusive Economic Zones, national and foreign indigenous territories, and global commons traverse the region. International

conflicts in the Arctic region pertain to matters of maritime jurisdiction and economic rights. The region is not governed by a single political entity; rather, it is comprised of numerous permanent and ad hoc inter-governmental organisations, such as the Arctic Council, Arctic Five, and Barents Euro Arctic Council (Hema, 2023). The majority of these organisations are regarding safety, environmental management, and scientific endeavours.

Few non-Arctic states also sustain a presence in the region to support their Arctic allies and conduct scientific and environmental research. In accordance with continental shelf surveys, Russia, Denmark, and Norway are establishing broader claims to the Arctic. Russia has asserted jurisdiction over law enforcement in international waters along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), in defiance of opposition from other nations. China contests the exclusive use of the Arctic region with Arctic nations and has positioned itself as a 'near-Arctic state' to establish legitimacy (Shu, 2023).

Geopolitics is not novel to the Arctic region. The Arctic region 'became an imaginative and material frontier for military science since the interwar period' (Eiterjord , 2023). Due to developments in rocketry and military aviation, the Arctic was conceived of as a strategic corridor. Furthermore, the waters, which were contaminated with ice, served as a physical barrier for covert operations; it was a region where submarines could manoeuvre without detection. By modulating these spaces for offensive purposes, a collection of military and sensory infrastructures rendered the Arctic region comprehensible to military strategists and operators, thereby establishing it as a geo-political and strategic space.

Geo-Economic Significance of the Arctic Region

Population density and historical inaccessibility resulting from the region's extreme physical environment contribute to the Arctic's relatively modest economy in comparison to other global regions. Resource exploitation constitutes the primary economic activity. Approximately four million individuals reside in the region.

Numerous mineral resources abound in this area. Geography, fauna, and political units in the Arctic are all altered by climate change. Indigenous people, including the Sami and the Inuit, inhabit this ice-covered region. Precipitous environmental conditions have prompted their adaptation. Minerals, gas and hydrocarbon reserves contribute to the geo-economic significance of the region (Gucyetmez & Dmello, 2024).

The US Geology Survey has estimated the potential presence of approximately 90 billion barrels of oil, 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids, 1669 trillion cubic feet of gas (Gucyetmez & Dmello, 2024). Arctic regions are geo-economically significant. The region's pathways and resources become more accessible as a result of climate change. As an effort to maximize their respective interests in the Arctic, various nations formulate policies in that direction. By 2035, the seasonal Arctic shipping lanes will not supplant the year-round traditional southern routes; however, with the progression of seasons and the retreat of sea ice, they will increase in profitability (Makarova, Serikkaliyeva, Mukhametdinov, & Gubacheva, 2023). As a consequence, there will be increased geo-economic motivation to exploit the area as a secondary, more expedient passageway connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean.

The North West Passage (NWP) experienced less traffic than the Northern Sea Route (NSR) due to Russia's historical legacy and capability. Along the NSR, Russian domestic transport continues to be the pre-dominant maritime activity. The Chinese energy sector and container traffic represent the NSR's principal international clientele. Decreases in annual sea ice stimulate economic expansion in the Arctic, thereby prolonging shipping seasons and facilitating the extraction of natural resources (Kossa, 2024). Regarding access rights to fossil fuel resources in international waters, non-Arctic nations become more assertive as the Arctic region becomes more navigable.

Geo-Strategic Importance of the Arctic Region

The military circumstance created by geographical elements is one possible interpretation of geo-strategy. Military operations revolve around search and rescue operations, asserting sovereignty claims, safeguarding natural resources, and engaging in global competition. The prevailing pattern among these states is a global competition,

which primarily transpires between Russia and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The greatest military manifestation in the Arctic is sustained by Russia. Canada and Norway have the most formidable Arctic military forces among the US allies (Chkhartishivili, 2023). Other non-Arctic nations, such as France, China, and the United Kingdom (UK), maintain sporadic military presences in the Arctic. The majority of military engagements in the area pertain to the safeguarding of the environment, search and rescue endeavours, or assistance to civilian authorities.

Additionally, both Russia and NATO maintain postures of deterrent force in the Arctic. Only NATO maintains a military presence in the Arctic. The US, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway are allies of NATO. Finland and Sweden are NATO allies (Folland, 2022). Yemeni Houthi militants' assaults on merchant vessels in the Red Sea has disrupted the World Trade. The volume of containers crossing the Red Sea on a daily basis decreased by 60% from November to December 2023, as vessels transporting products from Europe to Asia rerouted their itineraries around the Cape of Good Hope (Bonnel & Mchugh, 2024). This route increased the freight costs and expensive production delays because it took 10 days extra to the sailing schedule.

However, an alternative maritime route connecting Asia and Europe exists via the Northern Sea. Possibly a superior option, this route connects the Barents Sea near the Russian-Norwegian border to the Bering Strait. By 2035, all summer sea ice along the Siberian coast is projected to have vanished (Notz & Stroeve, 2018). The Northern Sea route effectively reduce the distance that vessels must traverse to deliver shipments from Shanghai to Rotterdam by approximately 3,000 NM (Suez Canal) and 6200 NM (Cape route). Additionally, Arctic navigation is conducted at speed below 18 miles. The potential fuel savings and emission reductions for a cargo ship traversing the Northern Sea route are better as compared to the Suez route. Significant actors in the arctic region compete for control over it due to the pre-ponderance of economic interests along this route.

Strategic and Economic Interests of Major Key Players in the Region

➢ **United States (US)**

Russian military activities in Arctic region stimulated the US to increase its military activities in the Arctic. The US incorporated the Arctic region into its national sec urity strategy to strengthen its position in the region. The Alaska Sea has approximately 20% of the Arctic's total hydrocarbon resources. Regional gas and hydrocarbon reserves are the primary US interests. The US has military and security interests. Russian naval activities in the Barents and Greenland Seas pose threat to US interests (Servo, Mattingsdal, Windsborrow, & Patton, 2023).

The US and Canada have established a strong early warning and detection system in the Arctic. Hi-tech aircraft deployments in Alaska shows US endeavours to modernise her fleet in Arctic region. Furthermore, US National Strategy advocates for the establishment of a deep-water port in Nome, Alaska. This development would facilitate entry for forthcoming Polar Security Cutters, which are multi-role icebreakers under development by the Coast Guard (Berkok & Secrieru, 2023).

The US Arctic deployments depends on NATO allied nations, as evidenced by the Biennial Exercise Cold Response 2022. The US-Norway Supplementary Defence Cooperation Agreement, which was recently revised, provides the clearest indication of US dedication to overseas access arrangements in the Arctic (Buckley, 2023). This agreement grants the US permission to construct military facilities at 03 Norwegian airfields and 01 naval base. By strengthening NATO's joint capability in the "High North" and facilitating harsh conditions training for US forces, this agreement will significantly improve the sustainability of the US presence in the European Arctic.

➢ **NATO**

Russia conducts weapon testing and maintains a Northern Fleet base of operations in the Barents Sea. NATO has increased its exercises and activities in Norway, including Trident Juncture in 2018 and Cold Response in 2022. The Russian Northern Fleet executed a significant naval exercise in August 2022 in retaliation to military operations from the West. The Russian's nuclear and hypersonic weapons

located in High North presents a significant security concern for the US and NATO (Strauss & Wegge, 2023). The US, NATO and Canada are bolstering their anti-submarine capabilities, intelligence gathering, and military deterrence in the Arctic in response to Russia's militarisation of the region. The objective of Nordic Defence Corporation (NORDEFCO) is to operationalise the Nordic military cooperation in the event of armed conflict, extending its reach beyond peacetime. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Finland and Sweden both joined NATO membership. By linking the Baltic Sea and the Arctic to a single continuous region of operation, the incorporation of Sweden and Finland enable the northern geographical region fully integrated with NATO's operational capacity. Likewise, ongoing Steadfast Defender 24 is NATO's largest military exercise since Cold War (Lokker, Townsend, Hautala, & Taylor, 2023).

➢ **Russia**

The Arctic region is significant to the nation-building of Russia and has profound historical background. In political context, the Arctic region eventually came to serve two purposes for Russia: military deterrence and economic growth. Securing the Arctic as a strategic resource base, conserving the Arctic region as a site of harmony and cooperation and developing the (Northern Sea Route) with an added security dimension are the objectives of the 2020 strategy of Russia (Baev, 2023). Military changes resulted in a shift in strategic priorities, with naval and operational assets transferred from the Western Strategic Command (Saint Petersburg) to the Northern Fleet Strategic Command (Severomorsk) providing importance to the Russian Arctic coastline. Russia assumed the Soviet Union's naval doctrine, which was founded upon the 'bastion' concept i.e., the maintenance of a substantial fleet of Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs) (Kofman, 2023). The fleet is entrusted with the responsibility of upholding Russia's influence in the area, ensuring security, projecting power, assisting in international operations beyond its designated area and sustaining Russia's nuclear capabilities at sea (Baev, 2023).



Figure 1: *Northern Fleet bases & garrisons in the Kola Peninsula* (Kejanas, 2022).

The most conspicuous indication of Arctic militarisation is the construction of additional military infrastructure and military stationing on Franz Joseph Land, Novaya Zemlya. In addition to bolstering Russia's defensive capabilities and reinforcing the validity and efficacy of the Northern Fleet's bastion doctrine, these military installations encircling the Russian Arctic have obstructed unrestricted access to and along the Northern Sea Route.

➢ **China**

Greater Chinese influence in the Far North is escalating inexorably. China attained observer status on the Arctic Council in 2013. China's 2018 Arctic Policy White Paper characterized the nation as a "near-Arctic state" (despite the fact that its northern most regions are situated 3,000 km from the Arctic Circle) and delineated an economic strategy referred to as the "Polar Silk Road" (Chen, 2023). The Belt and Road Initiative Maritime Cooperation Plan was officially unveiled in June 2017. At the outset, the plan characterised the Arctic Passage as an unprecedented aspect of the BRI, akin to traversing the Silk Road on Ice. China has attempted to ascend a position of

authority in the Arctic through the following eight distinct channels (Pezard, Flanagan, & Harrold, 2022):

a) Access, supported by UNCLOS – right to use the Arctic, military presence and commercial maritime operations in international waters of the Arctic region.
b) Through the establishment of a terrestrial research station in Svalbard, Norway (2003), which is within its jurisdiction as a signatory to the Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Treaty of 1920.
c) Via financial investments in Arctic states.
d) Establishing bilateral diplomatic relations with Arctic states that could potentially motivate them to collaborate with China.
e) By constructing and deploying pertinent capabilities and supporting infrastructure, in order to exert influence and conduct outreach operations.
f) Employ soft power to establish the Arctic as a shared patrimony of humanity and present China's stance as a state that "prefers cooperation over competition."
g) Through engagement in scientific investigation and commercial access.
h) International cooperation through participation in the Arctic Council and other regional and international organisations markets.

Russia-China Convergence: Threat of Military Confrontation with US & Her Allies

The invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022 caused significant disruption to the security architecture of Europe and brought about a transformation in the risk assessment that forms the foundation of the foreign and security strategies of neighbouring countries. The Arctic Council came into non-operational status when all (seven) of its members, excluding Russia, ceased attending official gatherings. Subsequently, the region was devoid of its primary inter-governmental platform for collaboration (Simpson, 2023).

➢ **Russian Military Deployment in Arctic**

Russian Arctic military authority and the nucleus of its regional presence is the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command. The western and central Arctic are within the zone of responsibility of the fleet. Defensive and conducive operational conditions for Russia's second-strike nuclear capability, in addition to safeguarding the motherland, are the fleet's principal obligations (Wall & Wegge, 2023). Two or more tactical units comprise each of the Northern Fleet's five operational formations. The Air-Defence Forces Army (AADA), three naval formations, and the Army Corps are included. Submarine Command and fleet of the Northern Fleet, in addition to the Kola Flotilla housing the majority of Arctic-specific naval assets (including some primary surface combatants), are among the naval formations. 10 emergency rescue stations, 20 border outposts, 30 airfields, 10 radar stations are dispersed throughout the approximately 3 major bases.

Eleven ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) of the Russian fleet are stationed on the Northern Fleet comprising 10 operational vessels and the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, the Northern Fleet possessed an official count of 37 surface vessels. Four main air units are stationed in the Arctic (Limon & Limon, 2024). The 279th Shipborne Fighter Regiment, which possesses an estimated 24 Su-33 fighter jets, and the 100th Shipborne Fighter Regiment, which maintains 24 MiG-29K fighter aircraft, are stationed at Severomorsk. Twelve MIG-31BMs, twelve Su-24Ms, and an undetermined quantity of Su-24MR reconnaissance craft are stationed at Monchegorsk with the 98th Mixed Air Regiment (Wall & Wegge, 2023). At Severomorsk, one can also find maritime patrol aircraft such as the Il-38N and Tu-42, in addition to an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) regiment. Additionally, prior to the conflict in Ukraine, the Northern Fleet commanded an estimated thirty bombers. In accordance with the Bastion defence concept, the Northern Fleet employs a "multi-layered, Arctic-capable, hardened air defence and sea denial system."

Figure 2: *Russian Military Deployment* (Wall & Wegge, 2023).

➢ **Domain Awareness**

Russia asserts that its Rezonans-N radar system has been installed at Indiga, the Kanin Nos Peninsula, and Novaya Zemlya bases. As purportedly sophisticated over the horizon capabilities, these systems are capable of detecting hypersonic missiles and stealth aircraft (Pezard, Flanagan, & Harrold, 2022). Conclusively, Russia possesses Arctic related space based ISR capabilities, such as Arktika-M weather satellites and Meridian-M communications satellites designed to assist with navigation.

➢ **Electronic Warfare**

At Severomorsk, Kamchatka, and Primorsky Krai, Russia reportedly maintains electronic or electromagnetic warfare centres. According to analysts' anti-submarine warfare and interference with maritime communications are characteristics of the systems that are likely to be deployed to such centres (Chiriac & Witington, 2024).

➢ **Sino-Russian Geo-Economic Activities in the Arctic**

Recent developments in technological and STEM R&D collaboration between China and Russia, coupled with Russia's recent decision to withdraw from the International Space Station (ISS) and in response to join the China Space program ultimately benefited both space-based Arctic initiatives and the Sino-Russia partnership (Suess & Crawford, 2024). An important Sino-Russian endeavour linked to this geo-economic integrated framework approach is the expeditious expansion, substantial financing, and cooperative development of a state wide initiative between Russia and China.

The research and development initiative yielded a variety of products with multiple functions, including Big Data applications, all while implementing 5G infrastructure throughout the Eurasian region of Russia, Beidou navigation, robotics, Kinzhal missiles and anti-satellite satellites. According to a report published by the Danish Intelligence Service in 2020, China's knowledge and capability development efforts in the region are intensifying (Eiterjord , 2023). The Canadian Global Affairs Institute's 2021 policy report asserts that Xue Long and Xue Long 2 owned by China are "Trojan dragons" that have operated under the pretence of conducting climate science and civilian scientific research.

➢ **Sino-Russian Strategy in the Space**

The strategic and unambiguous engagement between Russia and the US and its military in the Cislunar domain/space dimension over the Arctic is being facilitated through the implementation of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) funding, the development of dual-use technologies (e.g., China's Digital Silk Road), and overt quasi-military capabilities (Berkowitz & Williams, 2023). China is progressively posing a threat to US space and nuclear operations in the Arctic, including North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) and Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS). The Chinese have the ability to defeat these efforts, at times, through the use of sophisticated anti-satellite capabilities (ASATs). These all developments, deployments or even military movements are undoubtedly the

haste for resource competition among the major power states striving for power in Arctic (Berkowitz & Williams, 2023).

➢ **Sino-Russia Maritime Law Enforcement**

Russia and China reached a mutual agreement in March 2023 to establish a joint umbrella organisation to oversee traffic along the NSR. The signing of a bilateral Arctic maritime agreement took place in April, 2023 between the Chinese Coast Guard and the FSB Border Guard Service (Kuo, 2023). This formally incorporated China, which it claims to be a "near-Arctic state," into the security arrangements of the region. A scheduled Chinese NSR container-line service between St. Petersburg and Shanghai commenced operations in July 2023, coinciding with the initial shipment of Russian crude oil to Asia from Russia.

Russia-China Convergence: A Threat to US Interests

China is expanding its power in the Arctic through a progressive strategy, whereas Russia adopts a realist stance towards the Arctic. Additionally, US and its allies' interests in the region are imperilled by the influence and interests of these two states in Arctic region. To counter Russia and China's regional influence, the US is attempting to increase its Arctic authority. Principally, the Treaty of Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation between Russia and China, signed in 2001, established the groundwork for multi-format cooperation. Their mutual relations are characterised by the Treaty as a 'strategic cooperative partnership founded on principles of equality and trust.' (Kuo, 2023).

As part of the BRI, the two states endorsed a statement in May 2015 regarding collaboration to connect the Silk Road Economic Belt with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). A joint statement was issued by the leadership of Russia and China in 2016 regarding the enhancement of strategic stability as a means of preserving global security. Considered one of the three most significant geo-political flashpoints worldwide in the twenty-first century. A geo-economic regionalisation policy propelled

by China and Russia is being implemented in the Arctic. This process has been further expedited by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on global supply chains and is being progressively enabled by cutting-edge dual-use technologies (Trenin, 2020).

The global challenge to US hegemony coincides with deteriorating relations between the US and China, as well as between Russia and the US. This has contributed, in part, to the strengthening of Sino-Russian ties, particularly in the emerging Eurasian Arctic. Recognising China's future objectives and activities in the Arctic and aerial space domain requires an appreciation of Russia's 'sponsoring' role in China's endeavours. The explicit correlation between the Baltic region and the NATO membership of Sweden and Finland, as well as the intensification of Russian sanctions, have inadvertently contributed to the strengthening of Sino-Russian relations in the Arctic. China is presently a major power in Eurasia; however, in order to attain true international and global status, it must also participate in Arctic and Polar affairs. By establishing its sea power (along the NSR) and linked space status in the Arctic region, China assuming to accomplish its intrinsic geo-economic goals (Trenin, 2020).

Conclusion

Utilising the lens of neo-realism theory, behaviour of three major state players was examined and it revealed that because of anarchy and security dilemma – China, Russia and the US seek power in the region in order to maximise their interests. Furthermore, neo-realism posits that conflict is an intrinsic characteristic, frequently propelled by economic factors. Imposition of sanctions and isolation of Russia by western powers after Russia-Ukraine war make convergence of China and Russia inevitable. This increases the likelihood of military confrontations among the US, China, Russia and their respective regional allies and partners. Due to involvement of nuclear powers in arctic region, the potential consequences of Arctic conflicts on the security interests of non-Arctic states are substantial. Eruption of nuclear war cause widespread destructions which not only affect Arctic states but also the non-Arctic states. The above-mentioned repercussions comprise radioactive pollution, infrastructure devastation, ecosystem disruption and population displacement.

Moreover, Arctic conflicts have the potential to erode the foundations of institutions and legal structures that have been instituted to govern the area.

Through economic investments and incentives, China is establishing and expanding its influence over the Arctic states in response to its growing interest in the region. It seeks to gain entry to marine pathways for economic growth, similar to the BRI. Despite the US lagging significantly behind Russia and China in military advancements in the region, the present state of the international system, particularly in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, is anticipated to induce a re-evaluation of US foreign policy towards the region and augment both fiscal and military engagements. International actors under the umbrella of environment preservation have shifted their focus towards Arctic region because of availability of its abundant resources and strategic importance. This strategic pivot from geo-politics to geo-economics is basically to improve their economic conditions and secure economic interests.

Arctic theatre is primarily and significantly a US-Russia or NATO-Russia power struggle. However, China appeared as the emerging power and the US appeared as dominant dynamic power which is the primary concern prevailing in Arctic region. New manners of conflicts may be erupted in the Arctic as a result of the region's mounting economic opportunities and security dilemma. The argument concludes that a 'new Cold War' would ensue in the Arctic as a result of the region's expanding economic opportunities and security risks. This concept has both pros and cons on the stability of region and the world at large. Sustainable and peaceful developments in arctic region is possible only by the cohesive efforts of international community for the prevention of potential conflicts in the Arctic.

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