

THE REALIST PARADIGM AND REGIONAL SECURITY DYNAMICS IN SOUTH ASIA

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ABSTRACT

Power politics is no historical accident. According to Morgenthau it is a 'human fact' or 'logical necessity'. Power politics is always explored with in the forces of power reality and morality in order to discern each other. Realists' assumptions about the global affairs are practical implantation of what power politics is. However, power accumulation is the key interest among the power groups in South Asia resulting in sustained anarchic environment. During the past centuries, the South Asian region has witnessed the ascendancy and decadency of multi-civilizational great empires. Various areas have been ruled by different power-groups and ethnic entities under varying socio-religious characteristics, fighting for their survival and supremacy. It has witnessed shift from the most dominating monarchies to the ascendancy of imperial powers and the creation of non-state actors. Power politics and anarchy has been traced out as a persistent indicator in the South Asian politics raising security concerns.

Keywords: South Asia, Realism, Security, Power, Anarchy, Politics.

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INTRODUCTION

Realism draws the base line for the traditional anarchic environment in the region and how power politics has been shaped by the realists', means and ends to sustain the power reality of human kind. According to Hobbes, realism means "the condition of man is a condition of war of everyone against everyone".¹ Realism's mostly agreed traditional assumptions are state centrism, rational unit actors and power oriented states. Realism is based on a state of perceived sustainable anarchy, in which every man is in a state of war with the other man for the sake of his interest and power. Realism is an established theory in IR which is proven throughout the classical course of history. Basu explains that realists insist, we see what is a real world of politics not as others imagination or want.²

REALISM: THEORETICAL BASE UNDERSTANDING BEHIND SECURITY IN SOUTH ASIA

Realism is as ancient as human instinct that has been defined through the dominated anarchical feud in the primitive past. According to early and most referred manuscripts, realism can be traced out from the old scripts of Thucydides, as past contributes largely in the understanding of the present.³ Thucydides made several famous generalizations, through his mature observation in the War of Peloponnesian between Athens and Sparta that laid down the basis of realism. He pondered that war is a hard school master, or a violent teacher. His scripts' reflection reveals the depth of the prevailing system anarchy and the interest-oriented human nature, which made the ground for war and power imbalance between Athens and Sparta. Thucydides emphasized that the main cause behind all the predicaments was 'desire to rule', dominated with greed and ambition. "Concern for justice was overcome by desire for revenge, and oaths were no longer able to impose any limits on human deeds. Dishonest men were

¹ Rumki Basu, *International Politics: Concepts, Theories and Issues* (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2012): 131.

² Ibid

³ Malcolm Francis McGregor, *The Politics of the Historian Thucydides* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956): 107.

more readily praised for their cleverness, than simple and moderate men for their honesty".⁴

Whereas, Monten stresses that Thucydides introduced the element of what is known today 'the real politik' tradition, he never believed in democratic ideals and the real power of justice in an anarchic world.⁵ D'Anieri stresses on Thucydides' basics elements of realism, i.e. a) The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. b) Of gods we trust and of men we know, it is in their nature to rule whenever they can. c) What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear that this caused in Sparta. d) So far as right and wrong are concerned, there is no difference between the two.⁶ Moreover, Thucydides stressed on the exercise and distribution of power by the strong (interest oriented state-power behaviour), which may contribute with war and peace. Secondly, he mentioned the role of independent political unit actors (Athens and Sparta) with varying capabilities seeking survival in the absence of an overarching political authority. Thirdly, he specified the primordial human motivation and lack of shared morality among states in presence of power reality. Thucydides supports the core aspects of realism but he does not offer anything that we could immediately recognize as theory. Thus "the Peloponnesian War can therefore be used as a source of competing ideas about politics" rather than theoretical justification with undeniable relevance with the traditional power politics.⁷

Another ancient realpolitik thinker and the most referred political realist in the history of subcontinent, who defined the Hindu political philosophy and their external and internal policies is Kautilya, who wrote *Arthashastra* in 300 BC, a century after Thucydides.⁸ His tenure reflects extreme uncertainty and fear during the Greek invaders (on the

⁴ Michael Palmer, "Machiavellian Virtù and Thucydidean Aretē: Traditional Virtue and Political Wisdom in Thucydides", *ROP The Review of Politics* 51, no. 03 (1989): 365.

⁵ Jonathan Monten, "Thucydides and Modern Realism", *International Studies Quarterly* 50, no. 1 (2006): 3–26, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3693549>.

⁶ Paul J D'Anieri, *International Politics: Power and Purpose in Global Affairs* (Australia: Wadsworth, 2017): 79.

⁷ Jonathan Monten, "Thucydides and Modern Realism", *International Studies Quarterly* 50, no. 1 (2006): 3–26.

⁸ Ram Ranbir Singh, "Kautilya's Conception of State", *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 65, no. 1 (2004): 41, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41855796>.

subcontinent) and the absence of any centralized strong Hindu empire.⁹ His writing reflects harsh realist measures by the monarchs in order to maximize power and self-interest. Kautilya argues that moral reasoning is not very useful to state rulers faced with anarchy and intrigue.¹⁰ Furthermore, the Kautilian philosophy asserts that “neighbours are regarded as enemies and an enemy’s immediate neighbour as a friend” and believes in interest oriented alliances.¹¹ “An ally looks for securing his interests in the event of simultaneity of calumniates and in the events of growing enemy’s power.” He further mentions that “every adjacent kingdom is strong, Kautilya called it ‘foe’; if a kingdom has weak or no popular support, it is fit to be exterminated.”¹² Even if one cannot attack strong neighbour or ‘foe’, one can harass it silently and weaken it over time”.¹³ This offensive psyche further strengthened by Imam Hussain, he mentions that a conquering ruler has to be wise enough in choosing his state allies from the neighbouring countries, in order to achieve the goal of an ‘alliance system’ and being as the conqueror state at the centre. Kautilya believed that an enemy can be vulnerable by getting squeezed between the conqueror and his allies, briefly he emphasized on ‘prepare for war and plan to conquer’ rather ‘prepare for war and hope for peace’. However, he preached immorality and cunning opportunistic tactics in politics,¹⁴ but he also recognizes the importance of virtue in political life (to maintain *danda* with *dharma*) as compared to Machiavelli who stressed on realist approach along with the importance of a successful state.¹⁵ Kautilya is widely referred as the Machiavelli of India; both of them assert pre-emptive realist and imperialist measures.

Evolution of realism is further reinforced by the Machiavellian school of thought. As Machiavelli, correlates the required assertive role of

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Rumki Basu, *International Politics: Concepts, Theories and Issues*, (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2012).

¹¹ Fahmida Ashraf, “India-Afghanistan Relations: Post 9/11,” *Strategic Studies* 27, no. 2 (2007): 47.

¹² Roger Boseche, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India,” *The Journal of Military History* 67, no. 1 (2003): 17.

¹³ Ibid., 28.

¹⁴ D. M. Prasad, ‘Politics and Ethics in Kautilya's Arthashastra,’ *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 39, no. 2 (1978): 240–49.

¹⁵ Narasingha ProsadSil, “Political Morality vs. Political Necessity: Kautilya and Machiavelli Revisited,” *Journal of Asian History* 19, no. 2 (1985): 101–42.

a wise statesman (prince) in his principality, according to him “one masters the jungle only by utmost conformity to the ways of the jungle”.¹⁶ He defines the basic elements of real power politics and the patterns on which a state can survive. According to him, “states are acquired either with the arms of others, or with one’s own, either by chance or by skill”.¹⁷ Forde explains the Machiavellian strategy of state survival by accumulation of power and practice of ‘pre-emptive imperialism’, neutralizing threats when they are small and remote. “It must be remembered that, for both Thucydides and Machiavelli, the paradigmatic manifestation of realism is imperialism, and realism that justifies imperialism clearly leaves little room for a common good of states”.¹⁸

Moreover, under the classical realists, Carr argues that realist values are derived from power and ethics from politics. He believed that all political actions are derived from human nature, he also recognizes the centrality of power in creating the conditions for the moral conduct of international relations.¹⁹ Carr divides political power into three categories military, economy and power over opinion.²⁰ Power over opinion reveals the interrelated dynamics of social aspects in realism. Carr believes that clash of ideologies plays the most important role in animating international politics. The world is imperfect and anarchic as a result of inherited forces in human nature. “This being inherently a world of opposing interests and of conflicts among them, moral principles can never be fully realized, but best approximate through the ever temporary balancing of interests and the ever precarious settlements”.²¹

¹⁶ Steven Forde, "International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neorealism", *International Studies Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (June 1995): 141–60.

¹⁷ Niccolò Machiavelli and John Scott Ripon, *The Prince* (London: Printed for Sherwood, Neely, and Jones, 1810).

¹⁸ Steven Forde, "International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neorealism", *International Studies Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (June 1995): 141–60.

¹⁹ Sean Molloy, *Hidden History of Realism: A Genealogy of Power Politics* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

²⁰ Edward Hallett Carr and Michael Cox, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (Harper Perennial Basingstoke Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

²¹ Hans Joachim Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations the Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1960).

Morgenthau has explained the basic six principles of political realism, a) Objective laws, which have its roots in human nature, govern the political perception in a society. In order to improve society, it is necessary to understand the laws according to which a society lives, which eventually lays down the bases of tentative political reality. b) Political realism is flagged with the perspective of interests George Washington asserted that ‘interest is the governing principle’. The concept of interest is defined in terms of power that asserts its political facts.

Morgenthau defines the concept interest by linking reason and the facts to be understood. He believes that without such a concept, the theory of politics, international or domestic, would be altogether impossible.²² c) It has been said earlier that interest are defined in terms of power. The political and cultural environment of any state determines the content of power. “Power may comprise of anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man. Thus, power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another”.²³ d) Realism is fully aware of moral significance in political actions of a state but state interests cannot be guided under moral laws. Morgenthau beautifully explained that individual may say for himself ‘let the justice be done, even if the world perishes’ but the state has no right to follow the same perspective for the sake of the people who are under its care. He believed that there is no political morality without prudence. e) Political realism refuses to identify moral aspiration of any state. Therefore, state’s interest-oriented nature and power acquiring strategy in an anarchic world negate morality among any nation state. f) Lastly, Morgenthau asserts that the difference between realism and other school of thoughts is just ‘real’, which has deep roots in human nature and the prevailing anarchic system.

Realism further evolved during Cold war era under Waltzian approach, deeming in structural realism and with continued centrality of the state. He believed that the political system is composed of a structure under different specifications with varying capacities, “but if we look at the aggregate of events with a proper organizing principle in our minds, we may see the chaos, order”.²⁴ A system is defined as a set of interacting

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ewan Harrison, "Waltz, Kant and Systemic Approaches to International Relations", *Peace Research Abstracts* 39, no. 6 (2002): 147.

unit-states, each level has a system and each system consists of structure. Hoffmann defines an international system as “a pattern of relations among the basic units of world politics. The pattern is largely determined by the structure of the world, among other things”.²⁵

Hoffmann also elucidates that system is measured or distinguished from one another; through historical comparisons, important changes, and economic modifications. It can also be measured through the goals and objectives of its major units. The structure within the system is defined through the arrangement of their parts and partially by the characteristics of each part. It explains the recurrent patterns of the political units. The structural affect can be identified by drawing comparison of one country to another country’s behavioural patterns. It has also been said that the structure is vaguely defined, it lacks detailed content and it is an empty concept. The structure is the system-wide component that makes it possible to think of the system as a whole”.²⁶

In addition, realism has been divided into domains of defensive and offensive realism. According to Mearsheimer, defensive realism is frequently referred as ‘structural realism’, which has been derived from Waltz ‘*Theory of International Politics*’. The unit states are defensive because they aim to survive and for that they possess a security apprehension. The international anarchy mode pushes the unit states for power competition (within their own level) in order to meet their security needs and survival.²⁷ In offensive realism, Mearsheimer explains the behaviour of the states in anarchic structure of international system. In ‘*The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*’ he elucidates, “states gain power to guarantee their own survival”.²⁸ Anarchic structure of international system engages states in security competition, due to no higher authority, which may lead to power imbalance in the favour of more accomplished states.

Mearsheimer elucidated that, “states should maximize as much power as they can as their ultimate goal is to be a hegemon”.²⁹ In an

²⁵ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove: Waveland Press, 2010): 43.

²⁶ Ibid., 79.

²⁷ John J Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York; London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014).

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

uncertain international environment, any state might use its power to harm another state. Under such circumstances relative capabilities are important. On the contrary, offensive realists believe that “the international system forces great powers to maximize their relative power because that is the optimal way to maximize their security.”³⁰ Conversely, Tang in his article differentiates between defensive realism and offensive realism on the bases of nature of ‘conflict of interest’; in defensive realism, conflict of interest has both subjective and objective sides and can be both reconcilable and irreconcilable.³¹

Mearsheimer further refers to offensive-defensive balance in which the realists heavily support the defensive side, they believe in being ‘defensive positionalists’ instead of carrying aggressive strategies. However, the sustained anarchic environment in the South Asian region is shaped due to India-Pakistan hostility and instigating policies for survival. Both states followed offensive-defensive policy in order to gain their security objectives vis-à-vis each other in the region. Thus, under the realists’ ancient/classical and contemporary frame of work, the following assumptions are basic understanding defining regional anarchy and its security implications for South Asia, a) The unit-state centrality in world and regional politics as the principle actor. b) Anarchic regional environment. c) Dominance of power struggle between the unit states depending and varying on the level of interest among the states. d) Internal and external factors shape states’ behaviour. e) Lastly, rationality of how to cater the strategic environment, how to achieve the broader goals and security ends within and outside the region.

POWER AND ANARCHY

Phenomenologically, power explains change or shift in status quo.³² The law that power rules the relations of states is a principle that lies at the heart of all realism, classical, modern, and contemporary-points to expansion constrained only by limits of nation’s power, or by

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Shiping Tang, "The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis", *Security Studies* 18, no. 3 (2009): 599.

³² Ewan Harrison, "Waltz, Kant and Systemic Approaches to International Relations", *Peace Research Abstracts* 39, no. 6 (2002): 152.

countervailing outside power.³³ Whereas, the higher domains of virtue are acknowledged by the realists, but realism stresses that ‘in the world as it is, the final arbiter of political things is power’. Realists assert that power is the sole interest behind every major unit-actor in the international arena. According to Morgenthau ‘the act to seek power’ is by default inbuilt in human nature (power is a universally agreed objective category) and the ability to accept the ‘truth’ is in conflict with human’s fundamental capacity of recognizing reality. Morgenthau closes ‘*Scientific Man verses Power Politics*’ by declaring that man is caught in a perennial human tragedy, experiencing the contrast between the longings of his mind (reason) and his actual condition (necessity and lust for power)”.³⁴ Morgenthau gave a psychological foundation to power, under three basic drives for all men, the drive to live, to reproduce and to dominate. His focus in ‘*Politics Among Nations*’ was intrinsically bound to the concept of power in international politics and the centrality of the concept in IR.

Nye in ‘*The Future of Power*’, has explained that power is contested in nature but according to this paper the concept of power is least contested in nature (as compared to security); power has been the ultimate source of inspiration by material as well as by the social constraints of unit-actors in the international system.³⁵ Power is the absolute end, whether it is a question of survival (fear, concerns and insecurity of a state) or a step forward towards influence and hegemony. In the existing arena, power has changed its dimensions from material capabilities to social entities. In the era of nuclearization, power has been mushroomed according to different required domains of interests. Whereas, Foucault defines power as ‘immaterial’, as a ‘certain type of relationship between individuals’ and refers power to a relationship in which force is exercised.³⁶

Foucault emphasizes that ‘truth’ is inbuilt in the system of power, which is culturally specific, inseparable from ideology which often

³³ Steven Forde, "International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neorealism", *International Studies Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (June 1995): 141–60.

³⁴ Sean Molloy, *Hidden History of Realism: A Genealogy of Power Politics* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

³⁵ Joseph S Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).

³⁶ Michel Foucault and Colin Gordon, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980): 236.

coincides with various forms of hegemony. “We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth.”³⁷ Foucault’s relational concept of power is not based on interest oriented power accumulation process. He believes that power is everywhere and produced by multiple virtues of constraints and the ‘other’ of power is resistance.³⁸ Power is shaped by individuals and the levels of truth production process that integrate the relations of force and operate to form global domination.

Under Hobbesianism, anarchy is briefed as, ‘a jungle out there’.³⁹ Power and anarchy are rationally correlated, the more the anarchy, more power will be attained in order to sustain, and the more the power, more anarchy will be produced by other states. Though power and anarchy are interrelated but anarchy is vague in nature and it is not clear and assertive as power is in the IR domain. According to Guzzini, anarchy is unqualified concept, but its intentions are very clear. Waltz in ‘*Man the State and War*’ has said “in anarchy there is no automatic harmony”.⁴⁰ Whereas, Sorensen explains that “it is entirely true that anarchy is no given but a historical, natural condition to which the only possible reaction is adaptation. But the fact that anarchy is a historically specific, socially constructed product of human practice does not make it less real”.⁴¹ While, Waltz states that ‘human interaction generates organized complexity’ because the social system often develops in such a way that cannot be interoperated, due to unintended consequences which arises from the anarchic structure in the international system. Kant perceives anarchy as set of rules and resources that have recursive nature implicated in the process of history.

Moreover, Kant asserts the logical status of human agency in social theory, as Wendt claims that anarchy exists due to both agency and

³⁷ Mark Philp, "Foucault on Power: A Problem in Radical Translation?", *Political Theory* 11, no. 1 (1983): 29–52.

³⁸ Stephen Frederick Schneek, "Michel Foucault on Power/Discourse, Theory and Practice", *Hum Stud Human Studies* 10, no. 1 (1987): 15–33.

³⁹ Robert G Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism", *International Organization* 38, no. 02 (1984): 287.

⁴⁰ Stefano Guzzini, *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold* (London: Routledge, 2003).

⁴¹ Kenneth N Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).

social structure in world politics. On the agency side “how states interact to each other, affects the social life in which they are embedded, by logic of reciprocity”. If they militarize, others will be threatened and arm themselves, creating security dilemmas in terms of which they will define egoistic identities and interests”.⁴² He further elucidates that interpretation of social norms and the social interaction create and instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather than another. These identities define the state behaviour and the state of anarchy. Anarchy and other socially constructed concepts as ‘power’ are simply ‘what states make of them’.

The history of South Asia has observed extreme violence and terror throughout the earlier periods that ensures the trace outs of power struggle and anarchy in the region among different power groups. According to Farhat Mahmud, history emphasizes more on such narratives which have been the source of contention in the past. Different realists have discussed that history and human interaction have proven its relationship to persistent anarchic environment in the world affairs. Thus, this paper analyses that anarchy in South Asia is reflected through the violent historic narrative and anarchic environment, which possesses continuity in its nature.

John Vasquez in ‘*The Power of Power Politics*’ has discussed the three basic assumptions of realism by Morgenthau. He asserts the state centrality in international system, power struggle between the unit actors, and lastly separates the global politics from domestic affairs. Moreover, Molloy in ‘*The Hidden History of Realism*’ gave three fundamental assumptions of the realist paradigm, a) state centrism; b) states are rational actors, and the struggle for power as the aim of the states.⁴³ Anarchy is the resultant of how the unit actors interact and contest for power. But in this study, the prevailed anarchy is not due to power struggle between India and Pakistan. According to Palfreeman, “war and violence between sovereign states have their origin in the domestic weaknesses and failure of the member states of the system”.⁴⁴ The South Asian region inherited conflict zone as an aftermath of the decolonization. Barry Buzan in

⁴² Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

⁴³ John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

⁴⁴ Tony Palfreeman, ‘Security?’, *Australian Quarterly* 76, no. 3 (2004): 4–8.

‘Regions and Powers’ have mentioned that in Asia it is unlike America and Africa, “the process of decolonization left behind a state system that by and large reflected patterns established by pre-colonial political history”.⁴⁵

Though struggle for power and anarchy dominated the South Asian region but it was never the reason behind India-Pakistan rivalry after independence, neither had it transformed the region into conflict zone. South Asia inherited the conflict zone after the demarcation between India and Pakistan. Thus, realism does not qualify in terms of power and struggle in South Asia. There is anarchy and security dilemma in the region due to historical narratives and clash of identities pushing the region into persistent spiral of security dilemma.

SECURITY DILEMMA IN SOUTH ASIA

Security dilemma is the direct consequence of anarchic environment in global politics. Theoretically the term security dilemma was first coined by John Herz in 1950 and Butterfield in ‘*History of Human Relations*’ in 1951. According to Herz, security dilemma is not only a problem encountered by humans in a social constellation, rather a biological trait. In addition, he stresses that “whether man is ‘by nature’ peaceful and cooperative, or aggressive and domineering, is not the question. It is his uncertainty and anxiety as to his neighbour’s intentions that places man in this basic (security dilemma), and makes the ‘homo homini lupus’ (a man is a wolf to another man) is a primary fact of the social life of man. Basically it is the mere instinct of self-preservation which, in the vicious circle, leads to attain more power”.⁴⁶ Herz has indicated six major aspects of security dilemma, a) Anarchy is the ultimate source of security dilemma, b) Uncertainty and fear are the ultimate consequences, c) Accumulation of more power, d) Enhanced security concerns, e) Security dilemma can be one of the causes behind war, and lastly, f) Security dilemma is a self-reinforcing process ‘a vicious cycle’ (spiral).

⁴⁵ Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

⁴⁶ Shiping Tang, "The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis", *Security Studies* 18, no. 3 (2009): 590.

Jervis defines security dilemma as unintended force (built around perceptions and misperceptions among the defensive states), and structural in origin. It is the result of the two states' interaction in which the gain of one is the loss of the other leading to uncertainty and war between the two states. Lastly, he asserts that the dynamics of security dilemma are self-enforcing resembling to spiral.

However, security dilemma revolves around three basic assumptions between defensive states, i.e. a) An anarchic environment leads to uncertainty, b) A lack of trust that exists among states and accumulation of power, c) A misperception of each other's motives or intentions.⁴⁷ Tang's perceives that lack of malign intentions between states is one of the most important factor to determine a genuine security dilemma which has been ignored by many scholars. Lack of malign intentions represents defensive states with benign nature, whereas offensive states are malign in nature. He further emphasizes on the material and psychological factors that regulate and affect the security dilemma. Tang's rigorous definition of security dilemma states that security dilemma is the result of anarchic environment that pushes the state to acquire more power in an active security dilemma. Accumulation of more power has to be encountered with reaction through material and psychological regulators resulting in much exacerbated or deep security dilemma. The changing scenario shifts the defensive-benign states to offensive-malign states pushing them into a spiral of insecurity, causing expansionist/imperialist threats or mutual threat/deadlock ending on war or threat of war.

Since 1947, Pakistan and India indulged in traditional security dilemma, due to the fear of their survival (not because of power accumulation, power accumulation was the consequence of the inherited security dilemma). Along with ideological and psychological regulators both states resulted in exacerbated or deep security dilemma in the region. Both states contributed in arms race (nuclearization) and political alliances (US as global player) that eventually changed the newly born states to offensive and malign actors fearing war or threat to war in South Asia. However, security dilemma sustained and balance of power was attained in the region after nuclearization, but the obvious malign intentions and

⁴⁷ Umbreen Javaid and Marium Kamal, "Security Dilemma in South Asia", *Journal of Political Studies* 22, no. 1 (July 2015): 115.

war threat reveals illusionary security dilemma in South Asia that pushed the region in scrounge of non-state actors and terrorism.

BALANCE OF POWER IN SOUTH ASIA

The concept of balance of power is widely attached to the established theory of realism and reciprocates security dilemma, the more states are insecure, the more they will increase their power to attain material balance. Balance of power can be understood as the natural outgrowth of struggle for power or an approximately equal distribution of power or preservation of status quo. Morgenthau elucidates that balance of power is not a policy; it is a natural and inevitable consequence. According to Ernst Haas, balance of power is a system, a kind of self-regulatory mechanism. Guzzini offers that balance of power prevents war and can be one of the main reasons behind its outbreak.⁴⁸

Moreover, Waltz explains that ‘structure is a generative notion’, the structure acts as a selector through eliminating the unit actors who are not responding to the system. While the generative properties of the structure are anarchic in nature that emphasizes on completion and socialization among the unit-actors, if the unit-actors fail they will be punished and eliminated whereas the surviving units encouraged for homogenization of unit and promote the convergence of international system around balance of power. Further Waltz explains that the concept of balance of power theory is based on three assumptions about states that they are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation, and lastly at a maximum drive for universal domination. Balance of power is an end-system which is conceived after the development of security dilemma.

Robert Kaplan examines six systems in international politics, balance of power, loose bipolar, tight bipolar, unit veto, universal and lastly hierarchic, among which balance of power system dominated the international politics.⁴⁹ Kaplan defines balance of power under six major rules, which has to be attained by the unit-actor. These rules include: a) Act to increase capabilities and negotiate rather than fight. b) Fight rather

⁴⁸ Stefano Guzzini, *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold* (London: Routledge, 2003).

⁴⁹ Mark Blitz, “Reviewed Work: Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos by Robert D. Kaplan,” *The National Interest*, 67 (Spring, 2002): 126-131.

than pass up an opportunity to increase capabilities. c) Stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential national actor. d) Act to oppose any collation or single actor which tends to assume a position of dominance with respect to the rest of the system. e) Act to constrain actors who subscribe to supranational organizing principles. f) Permit defeated or constrained essential national actor to re-enter the system as acceptable role partners or act to bring some previously inessential actor within the essential actor classification. Treat all the essential actors as acceptable role partners”.⁵⁰ Moreover, it is illustrated by Waltz that balance of power falls into two major categories: a) Internal efforts (move to increase economic capability, to increase military strength, to develop clever strategies) and b) External efforts (moves to strengthen and enlarge one’s alliance or to weaken and shrinks an opposing one).

HEGEMONIC ORDER AND SOUTH ASIA

Hegemony is imperialism in positive terms. The principle meaning is divided between the two following concepts, a) Material aspect of domination (predominance of military and economic capabilities) and b) Normative aspect of leadership (rise of political morality beside the material capabilities). Theoretically, the concept of hegemony in the global scenario is political and cultural dominance or authority over others and it requires legitimacy from the group on which it possesses control. Watson believes that hegemony is the material condition that enables one or group of powers in a collective system to build pressure and inducement to bear that most others states lose some of their freedom of action *de facto*, though not *de jure*.⁵¹ “Great powers, I argue, are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as their final goal”.⁵²

It may require a great capacity of coercion or a great degree of influence and control within the international system; it does not cover any form of annexation and occupation of any other territory as per the traditional form of politics. Ian Clark defines hegemony in terms of ‘dominance and leadership’, dominance through material gain and

⁵⁰ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove: Waveland Press, 2010)

⁵¹ G. John Ikenberry & Daniel H. Nexon, “Hegemony Studies 3.0: The Dynamics of Hegemonic Orders,” *Security Studies*, issue no 28, 3(2019): 395-421, doi: 10.1080/09636412.2019.1604981.

⁵² Ian Clark, *Hegemony in International Society* (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2011).

leadership through political morality. Antoniades explains hegemony as, “the factors on which the superiority of the hegemon may lie”. These factors include geography, natural resources, industrial, financial, economic, military capacity and preparedness, population, morale, unity, quality of diplomacy and government.⁵³

Under Gramscian approach, it is argued that hegemony could be further divided in two types, a) political control: domination that is based on coercion, and b) hegemony that is based on consent. Hegemony represents the status of the most powerful country in international system or the position of a dominant state in a specific region. For Gramsci, hegemony entails ‘cooperation ensured by force’, combining social and political supervision, force and consent. Mearsheimer explains that there are five assumptions behind great power starvation for hegemony, a) Sustained anarchy in international system, b) States possess offensive military capability against their rivals, c) Uncertain situation and hostile intentions and distrust among states, d) Survival is foremost goal of great powers, e) Great powers are the rational actors in international system.⁵⁴ Sait Yilmaz has also identified five essential characteristics of state-unit to become a power centre, a) Economical capacity influential globally, b) Technological development particularly in energy and communication, c) Money; globally valued and saved, d) A strong military with nuclear arms and Ten infantry divisions operational at overseas areas, e) Geographically positioned with a crucial ally, main sea routes, drinkable water resources, energy sources, and defensive features.⁵⁵

INDIAN REGIONAL HEGEMONIC DESIGNS IN SOUTH ASIA

India lies at the heart of South Asia, by default; India qualifies some of the supporting ingredients for being a regional hegemon. Along with her deep rooted values, growing economy and rich culture, India shares strategic interests in the region. India’s regional policies depict its growing sphere of influence in South Asia. Besides that, Indian hegemonic

⁵³ Andreas Antoniades, *From Theories of Hegemony to Hegemony Analysis in International Relations* (University of Sussex, 2008): 03.

⁵⁴ John J Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York; London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014).

⁵⁵ Sait Yilmaz, "State, Power, and Hegemony", *Center for Promoting Ideas* 1, no. 3 (December 2010):08.

designs are contested in nature.⁵⁶ It is difficult for India to get hegemonic recognition by the peripheral states in South Asia. In addition, India cannot be a legitimate hegemon in the presence of Pakistan. Indian hegemony is more elaborated as 'soft hegemon' or the 'benevolent hegemon' in the region. India requires consent and legitimacy by other regional states for the favourable outcomes. Legitimacy is often provided by the states which get benefited from the hegemony of certain states in the region, as the case in Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST). "According to HST, other states will cooperate with a benign hegemon because they benefit strategically and economically".⁵⁷

The adversary like Pakistan has the capacity to hinder the Indian regional hegemonic designs in South Asia. "A regional hegemon is comforted with the presence of a peer competitor and in this way it can no longer be able to maintain a status quo power. Indeed, it would go to a considerable extent to weaken and to destroy its rival. Of course, both regional hegemon would be motivated by a fierce security competition".⁵⁸

Indian hegemonic designs create great security concerns for Pakistan as India is functional towards a workable coalitional hegemony in the region. According to Watson who presented the formulation of 'concert' collective hegemony that gave its horizontal and vertical axis with potential relationship in order to maintain their asserted equilibrium and hegemony.⁵⁹ "A working concert requires two sets of predictions. One is the commonality of interest amongst the great powers collectively; the other is the vertical axis of consent whereby the lesser states in the region would be willing to accede to any such arrangement."⁶⁰ The Indian collective hegemonic objectives are not supported with consent and legitimacy of all the South Asian states, especially by Pakistan due to security reasons. Thus, India is perceived with coalitional hegemonic intentions in the South Asian region.

⁵⁶ "Indian Hegemony in South Asia", *UK Essays*, November 2018, accessed on March 10, 2021, <https://www.ukessays.com/essays/history/india-and-its-regional-hegemony-in-south-asia-history-essay.php>.

⁵⁷ Ian Clark, *Hegemony in International Society* (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2011).

⁵⁸ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York; London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014).

⁵⁹ Adam Watson, *International Relations & The Practice of Hegemony* (University of Westminster, 2002): 04.

⁶⁰ Ian Clark, *Hegemony in International Society* (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2011).

CONCLUSION

Realism is the core base theoretical understanding behind the security concerns in South Asia. The region is still caught in the traditional security paradigm, with towering rivalry between India and Pakistan. Anarchy has proven as one of the persistent variables in the post-colonial period that led to many unintended security consequences in South Asia, due to: a) Inherited historical continuities and unfinished agenda of partition, b) Distrust on power accumulation, c) Malign security dilemma, and d) Indian hegemonic intentions and influence in the region. Thus, the paper addresses the theoretical rationale behind the paranoiac disorder and anarchism between India and Pakistan. Both states are in dire need to bring balance between the traditional and non-traditional security concerns, and shift their priorities with proactive measure from traditional security concerns to economic security and sustainability as per the existing need of the hour.